

$B_n = \{w_1, \dots, w_n\}$  is a basis of  $V$

in

because otherwise

C In fact,  $B_n = C$  b/c o/w  $w_{n+1} \in \text{span } B_n$

$\Rightarrow C$  lin dep.  $\square$

Cor dimension of fin dim vs's is well-defined

Cor If  $V$  is a fin dim vs,  $S \subseteq V$  lin ind, then we may extend  $S$  to a basis of  $V$  by adding some  $\dim V - |S|$  elements.

Pf Apply the "basis production algorithm" from the theorem's proof.  $\square$

Cor If  $V$  fin dim vs and  $T \subseteq V$  generates  $V$ , then some subset  $S \subseteq T$  is a basis of  $V$ .  $\square$

Cor If  $S \subseteq V$  and  $|S| = n = \dim V < \infty$ , then  $S$  is lin ind iff  $\text{span } S = V$ .  $\square$

$$e_i := (0, \dots, 0, \overset{i\text{-th}}{1}, 0, \dots, 0)$$

E.g. (1)  $F^n$  has basis  $\{e_1, \dots, e_n\}$  so  $\dim F^n = n$ .

(2) Let  $S = \{(1, 0, 0), (1, 2, 0), (1, 2, 3)\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^3$ . Since

(a)  $(1, 2, 0) \notin \text{span}\{(1, 0, 0)\}$

(b)  $(1, 2, 3) \notin \text{span}\{(1, 0, 0), (1, 2, 0)\}$

(c)  $\dim \mathbb{R}^3 = 3 = |S|$

know  $S$  is a basis of  $\mathbb{R}^3$ .

(3)  $\dim \underbrace{F[x]}_{\text{polynomials of deg} \leq n} = n+1$  basis  $\{1, x, x^2, \dots, x^n\}$

$$(4) \dim F^{m \times n} = mn.$$

Problem Determine  $\dim F[x, y]_{\leq n}$  where

- $F[x, y]$  = 2-var polynomials over  $F$ ,
- $\deg \sum \lambda_{ij} x^i y^j = \max \{ i+j \mid \lambda_{ij} \neq 0 \}$
- $F[x, y]_{\leq n} = \{ f \in F[x, y] \mid \deg f \leq n \}$ .

# Condorcet's Voting Paradox

Candidates A, B, C

29 voters

Preferences

$A > B > C$

$A > C > B$

$B > A > C$

$B > C > A$

$C > A > B$

$C > B > A$

# voters

5

4

2

8

8

2

model assumption: every voter can  
linearly order preferences



$A > B$

$17 - 12 = 5$

$B > C$

$15 - 14 = 1$

$C > A$


$18 - 11 = 7$

$A > B > C > A$  — Condorcet cycle

Task Teams A, B, C schedule sequential head-to-head votes so your candidate wins — become a dictator through bureaucracy!

C: first do A vs B — A wins  
then A vs C — C wins

We can visualize the total binary preferences as



This is called a Condorcet cycle  
and it leads to a voting paradox.

Marie Jean Antoine  
Nicolas de Caritat,  
Marquis of Condorcet

1743-1794 CE



Goal Use linear algebra  
to understand how / when  
such cycles exist.

Set  $V = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow \downarrow \nearrow \\ c \quad b \quad a \\ \downarrow \\ C \xrightarrow{\quad} B \end{array} \mid a, b, c \in \mathbb{R} \right\} \approx \mathbb{R}^3$

$(a, b, c)$

An  $A > B > C$  voter corresponds to  $\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow \downarrow \nearrow \\ -1 \quad 1 \\ C \xrightarrow{\quad} B \end{array}$ , etc

In the above example, the election is the vector

$$5 \cdot \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow \downarrow \nearrow \\ -1 \quad 1 \\ C \xrightarrow{\quad} B \end{array} + 4 \cdot \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow \downarrow \nearrow \\ -1 \quad 1 \\ C \xrightarrow{\quad} B \end{array} + \dots + 2 \cdot \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow \downarrow \nearrow \\ -1 \quad 1 \\ C \xrightarrow{\quad} B \end{array}$$

$(A > B > C) \qquad (A > C > B) \qquad (C > B > A)$

Dfn Call a vector in  $\mathbb{R}^3$  purely cyclic when it is of the form

$(\lambda, \lambda, \lambda) = (1, 1, 1)$  for some  $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$ . Let

$C = \text{span} \left\{ \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow \downarrow \nearrow \\ -1 \quad 1 \\ C \xrightarrow{\quad} B \end{array} \right\}$  be the subspace of purely cyclic vectors.

To have no cyclic component is to be perpendicular to  $C$


$$(a, b, c) \perp (x, y, z) \iff ax + by + cz = 0$$

$(a, b, c) \cdot (x, y, z)$  — more on this  
when we study inner product spaces

$$So \quad C^\perp = \{ (a, b, c) \in \mathbb{R}^3 \mid ak + bk + ck = 0 \quad \forall k \in \mathbb{R} \}$$

$$= \{ (a, b, c) \in \mathbb{R}^3 \mid a + b + c = 0 \}$$

$$= \{ b(-1, 1, 0) + c(-1, 0, 1) \mid b, c \in \mathbb{R} \}$$



Get an ordered basis

$$B = \left( \underbrace{(-1, 1, 0)}_C, \underbrace{(-1, 0, 1)}_{C^\perp} \right) \text{ of } \mathbb{R}^3$$

If  $\text{Rep}_B(a, b, c) = (x, y, z)$ , call  $x$  the cyclic component,  
 $y, z$  the non-cyclic components.

$$\begin{array}{c} \swarrow -1 \quad \searrow 1 \\ A \leftrightarrow B \\ \hline C \end{array} \quad A > B > C$$

E.g.  $\text{Rep}_B(1, 1, -1) = (x, y, z) \Leftrightarrow (1, 1, -1) = x(1, 1, 1) + y(-1, 1, 0) + z(-1, 0, 1)$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{array}{l} x - y - z = 1 \\ x + y = 1 \\ x - z = -1 \end{array} \Leftrightarrow \left( \begin{array}{ccc|c} 1 & -1 & -1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & -1 \end{array} \right) \xrightarrow{\text{rref}} \left( \begin{array}{ccc|c} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1/3 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 2/3 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & -4/3 \end{array} \right)$$

so  $\text{Rep}_B(1, 1, -1) = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}, -\frac{4}{3}\right)$ . ☺ Rational preference  
 $A > B > C$  has a cyclic component!

Similarly,  $\text{Rep}_B C > B > A = \left(-\frac{1}{3}, -\frac{2}{3}, \frac{4}{3}\right)$ .

Defn The sign of the cyclic component is the spin of the vector.

Positive Spin

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -1 \quad \nearrow 1 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1} B \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 1/3 \quad \nearrow 1/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{1/3} B \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -4/3 \quad \nearrow 2/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{2/3} B \end{array}$$

$A > B > C$

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 1 \quad \nearrow -1 \\ C \xrightarrow{1} B \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 1/3 \quad \nearrow 1/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1/3} B \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 2/3 \quad \nearrow -4/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{2/3} B \end{array}$$

$B > C > A$

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 1 \quad \nearrow -1 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1} B \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 1/3 \quad \nearrow 1/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{1/3} B \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -4/3 \quad \nearrow 2/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{-4/3} B \end{array}$$

$C > A > B$

cyclic      sum of non-cyclic

Negative Spin

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 1 \quad \nearrow -1 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1} B \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -1/3 \quad \nearrow 1/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1/3} B \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow 4/3 \quad \nearrow -2/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{-2/3} B \end{array}$$

$C > B > A$

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -1 \quad \nearrow 1 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1} B \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -1/3 \quad \nearrow -1/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1/3} B \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -2/3 \quad \nearrow 1/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{-2/3} B \end{array}$$

$A > C > B$

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -1 \quad \nearrow -1 \\ C \xrightarrow{1} B \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -1/3 \quad \nearrow -1/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{-1/3} B \end{array} + \begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -2/3 \quad \nearrow -2/3 \\ C \xrightarrow{4/3} B \end{array}$$

$B > A > C$

Contribution

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -a \quad \nearrow a \\ C \xrightarrow{a} B \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow b \quad \nearrow -b \\ C \xrightarrow{-b} B \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow c \quad \nearrow c \\ C \xrightarrow{-c} B \end{array}$$

The election results in a Condorcet cycle when

all three sides of  $\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -a+b+c \quad \nearrow a-b+c \\ C \xrightarrow{a+b-c} B \end{array}$  have

the same sign

$$\begin{array}{c} A \\ \swarrow -a+b+c \quad \nearrow a-b+c \\ C \xrightarrow{a+b-c} B \end{array}$$

If all positive,

$$\begin{aligned} -a+b+c > 0 &\quad \cancel{-a} \quad + \quad \cancel{c} > 0 \Rightarrow c > 0 \\ a-b+c > 0 &\quad \cancel{a} \quad + \quad \cancel{c} > 0 \Rightarrow b > 0 \\ a+b-c > 0 &\quad \cancel{a} \quad + \quad \cancel{-c} > 0 \Rightarrow a > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, if all negative,  $a, b, c < 0$ .

Thm If there is a Condorcet cycle, then  $a, b, c > 0$  or  $a, b, c < 0$ .

Is the converse true?

$a = 15$	$-a+b+c = -13$
$b = 1$	$a-b+c = 15$
$c = 1$	$a+b-c = 15$

so not a Condorcet cycle

Fact As the # of voters  $\rightarrow \infty$ ,

$$P(\text{Condorcet cycle}) \rightarrow \frac{\arcsin \frac{\sqrt{6}}{9}}{\pi} \approx 0.0877$$